


Uncertainty-Centric Safety Assurance of ML-Based Perception for Automated Driving

Krzysztof Czarnecki


Waterloo Intelligent Systems Engineering (WISE) Lab
University of Waterloo




UNIVERSITY OF
WATERLOO

Wat**CAR** 
driving innovation

Uncertainty-Centric Assurance of ML-Based Perception



Uncertainty-Centric Assurance of ML-Based Perception



Responsible Sensitive Safety (RSS)

- Defines responsible behavior to address **behavioral uncertainty**
 - Safe actions when safe and proper response when not safe
- Guarantees no collision when everyone follows the rules



Responsible Sensitive Safety (RSS)

- RULE 1.** Do not hit the car in front
(longitudinal distance)
- RULE 2.** Do not cut in recklessly
(lateral distance)
- RULE 3.** Right of way is given, not taken
- RULE 4.** Be cautious in areas with limited visibility
- RULE 5.** If you can avoid a crash without causing another one, you must



RULE 1. Safe Following Distance in RSS

Distance traveled
due to reaction time

Braking distance

Distance traveled
by front vehicle


$$d_{min} = \left[v_r \rho + \frac{1}{2} a_{max, accel} \rho^2 + \frac{(v_r + \rho a_{max, accel})^2}{2 a_{min, brake}} - \frac{v_f^2}{2 a_{max, brake}} \right] +$$




RULE 1. Safe Following Distance in RSS

$$d_{min} = \left[v_r \rho + \frac{1}{2} a_{max, accel} \rho^2 + \frac{(v_r + \rho a_{max, accel})^2}{2a_{min, brake}} - \frac{v_f^2}{2a_{max, brake}} \right] +$$


Problem: Assumes perfect perception




Perception Triangle




Safety Argument Decomposition




RSS as a Constraint on ADS



RSS as a Constraint on ADS



Sample RSS-Compliant World Model Schema




Safe following distance

Safe action set Safe(s)

Perception Cases ($s \rightarrow s'$)


Correct Perception

$s \rightarrow s'$ where $s = s'$



Misperception

$s \rightarrow s'$ where $s \neq s'$



Safety of Perception


Misperception $s \rightarrow s'$ potentially causes safety risk iff

$$\text{Safe}(s') \not\subseteq \text{Safe}(s).$$


Safety-Irrelevant Misperceptions

Misperception $s \rightarrow s'$ where $\text{Safe}(s) = \text{Safe}(s')$


Precise World Model



Perceptual Uncertainty Handling via Imprecise World Models



Perceptual Uncertainty Aware RSS (PURSS)



Lifting World Model Schema to Imprecise World Model Schema

Elementwise lifting:

- Class entity to superclass
- Continuous value to interval
- Discrete value to enumerated set
- Derived attributes via set operations and interval arithmetic

Using Imprecise World Models to Mitigate Misperception



Given an under-perception case, where S is an imprecise model of confidence α perceived when the correct model:

$$s \rightarrow_{\alpha} S$$


A safe action in an imprecise model must be safe for every precise model covered by the imprecise model.

$$\text{Safe}(S) = \bigcap_{s_i \in S} \text{Safe}(s_i)$$


Different Risk Levels



Imprecise Classification when High Integrity Required




Conservative Action for High Integrity




$$\text{Safe}(S) = \bigcap_{s_i \in S} \text{Safe}(s_i)$$

Example of Mitigation




Actions: continue or stop or follow

Safety Requirements on Perception Performance from PURSS




Uncertainty-Centric Assurance of ML-Based Perception




Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM)


- True accuracy unknowable
 - Accuracy in ML wrt. test set only
- Must estimate uncertainty




Perception Triangle (Instance-Level)



Perceptual Triangle




Instance-level




Domain-level (generic)


Perceptual Triangle When Using Supervised ML





Factors Influencing Uncertainty (F1-7)



Factors Influencing Uncertainty (F1-7)




F3: Scene Uncertainty




F3: Scene Uncertainty


- Surrogate measures
 - range, scale, occlusion level, atmospheric visibility, illumination, clutter and crowding level
- Also part of development data set coverage
- To determine sufficient coverage, compare these measures with
 1. Test set accuracy
 2. Estimated uncertainty by the network


Synthetic Dataset to Study Scene Influence Factors



Scene Influence Factors -> Accuracy









Aleatoric and Epistemic Uncertainty


Predictive Entropy (PE) = $H(E(p))$

Aleatoric Entropy (AE) = $E(H(p))$


Mutual Information (MI) = PE - AE (Epistemic Uncertainty)



Scene Influence Factors -> Uncertainty Estimates




Occlusion and Depth -> Uncertainty Estimates








Buu Phan, Samin Khan, and Rick Salay, and Krzysztof Czarnecki. Bayesian Uncertainty Quantification with Synthetic Data. In Proceedings of International Workshop on Artificial Intelligence Safety Engineering (WAISE), SAFECOMP, Turku, Finland, 2019

Occlusion and Depth -> Uncertainty Estimates




Rain, Clouds, Puddles -> Uncertainty Estimates






Coming Soon: Canadian Adverse Driving Conditions Dataset



Summary: Uncertainty-Centric Assurance of ML-Based Perception





Insights and Challenges

- ML currently cannot be assured to certainty levels required for collision avoidance
 - ML is useful for longer-term, anticipatory risk reduction
- Perceptual uncertainty must be considered for the complete, fused perception and over time
 - E.g., different information becomes certain with different delays
- Out-of-distribution detection is still far from being useful in practice
- RSS leads to more conservative automated driving than human driving
 - E.g., negotiation in merging